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Abstract— Major transmission projects are needed to 
integrate and to deliver renewable energy (RE) resources. 
Cost recovery is a serious impediment to transmission 
investment. A negotiation methodology is developed in this 
study to guide transmission investment for RE integration. 
Built on Nash bargaining theory, the methodology models 
a negotiation between an RE generation company and a 
transmission company for the cost sharing and recovery of 
a new transmission line permitting delivery of RE to the 
grid. Findings from a six-bus test case demonstrate the 
Pareto efficiency of the approach as well as its fairness, in 
that it is consistent with one commonly used definition of 
fairness in cooperative games, the Nash cooperative 
solution. Hence, the approach could potentially be used as 
a guideline for RE investors. The study also discusses the 
possibility of using RE subsidies to steer the negotiated 
solution towards a system-optimal transmission plan that 
maximizes total net benefits for all market participants. 
The findings suggest that RE subsidies can be effectively 
used to achieve system optimality when RE prices are fixed 
through bilateral contracts but have limited ability to 
achieve system optimality when RE prices are determined 
through locational marginal pricing. This limitation needs 
to be recognized in the design of RE subsidies.  
Index Terms— Renewable energy integration, 
Renewable portfolio standard, Generation interconnection, 
Merchant transmission, Nash bargaining, Game theory 
NOMENCLATURE 
Indices and sets: 
n Index for buses 
s Index for scenarios 
t Index for subperiods 
i Index for generators 
j Index for loads 
b Index for supply or bid blocks 
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k Index for transmission lines 
g Index for the RE generation unit of the RE 
generation company (RE-GenCo) 
o(k) Sending-end of transmission line k 
r(k) Receiving-end of transmission line k 
n(g) Planned bus location of the RE unit g 
N  Set of all system buses 
T  Set of all time subperiods  
S  Set of all scenarios 
G
n  Set of generators at Bus n 
L
n  Set of loads at Bus n 
b
i  Set of blocks for Generator i 
b
j  
Set of blocks for Load j 
TG  Set of conventional generators 
RG  Set of RE generators 
ET  Set of existing transmission lines 
CT  Set of candidate transmission lines 
G  Set of all system generators 
L  Set of all system loads 
  
Parameters: 
tD  Duration of subperiod t 
G
ib  Offer price of the bth block by the ith generator 
L
jb  Bid price of the bth block by the jth load 
kICT  Annualized investment cost for transmission line k 
G
ibP  Size of the bth block for the ith generator 
L
jbP  
Size of the bth block for the jth load 
G
ibtsP  Size of the bth block for the ith RE generator at 
subperiod t in scenario s 
kF  Transmission capacity of line k 
kX  Transmission reactance of line k 
 SR RE subsidy per MWh of RE produced 
RGIC  Annualized RE generation investment cost  
RGd  Threat point of the RE-GenCo 
Td  Threat point of the TransCo 
FP
 
RE contract price ($/MWh) for RE-GenCo 
M An arbitrary large constant used in the 
representation of an optimization constraint 
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Decision variables: 
G
ibtsP  Power produced by the bth block of the ith 
generator at subperiod t in scenario s. 
L
jbtsP  
Dispatched load for the bth block of the jth 
load at subperiod t in scenario s. 
G
itsP  
The total dispatch (i.e., all cleared offer 
blocks) of the ith generator at subperiod t in 
scenario s.   
kY  Binary 0-1 decision variable for transmission 
line candidate k.  
  Negotiated payment rate ($/MWh) from the 
RE-GenCo to the TransCo. 
ktsF  Power flow of transmission line k at subperiod 
t in scenario s. 
ntsLMP  LMP of Bus n at subperiod t in scenario s.  
δnts Voltage angle of Bus n at subperiod t in 
scenario s. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
AJOR transmission projects are needed in the 
United States and other countries to integrate 
renewable energy (RE) resources into the power grid 
from remote areas. The delivery of RE is important for 
meeting Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). However, 
as of February 2009, nearly 300,000MW of wind 
projects were waiting to be connected to the grid [1]. A 
key factor causing the backlog is the uncertainty 
concerning who should bear the transmission investment 
costs. This issue is to be resolved to encourage 
transmission investment to fulfill the RPS mandates. 
The transmission expansion planning problem has 
been addressed by researchers from a technical 
perspective [2]-[7]. These studies focus primarily on 
optimal transmission investment decisions from 
centralized approaches, typically undertaken by 
centralized transmission planners or regulatory bodies. 
Usually, the plan is associated with a FERC-approved 
rate to recover the transmission investment. Various rate 
methods have been examined in the literature [8]-[11]. 
In addition to centralized planning approaches, 
decentralized market-based transmission planning 
approaches have also been explored [12]-[14].  
Responsibility for the costs of transmission for 
reliability, economic, and operational performance 
purposes is typically assigned to load via a regulated rate. 
Generation developers usually bear the transmission cost 
for interconnecting their proposed generators. For 
example, currently RE Generation Companies (RE-
GenCos) have to pay a large amount of interconnection 
costs to transmission owners prior to the service date.  
As a result, RE-GenCos bear the entire risk of both 
generation and transmission investments. This risk 
increases financing costs and discourages RE investment.  
Merchant transmission projects provide RE-GenCos 
an alternative for connecting to the grid. In merchant 
transmission development, merchant Transmission 
Companies (TransCos) are responsible for financing and 
sponsoring the projects [15].  They recover investment 
costs by providing transmission services. The recovery, 
unlike that in traditional regulated transmission projects, 
is not guaranteed through an existing rate structure. 
Hence, it could be beneficial for TransCos to negotiate 
with RE-GenCos to share risks and to help with the 
recovery of investment costs. 
From the perspective of an RE-GenCo, the preferred 
option might seem to be to build RE generation units 
and transmission lines itself because the centralized 
planning could result in maximum expected profits [7]. 
However in market environment, two issues could make 
the RE-GenCo choose instead to seek out a merchant 
TransCo partner: tremendous risks; and financing 
difficulties. Under the centralized planning option, the 
RE-GenCo would bear the entire risk arising from price 
volatility and renewable energy intermittency. 
Moreover, the required investment in both generation 
and transmission would require an extremely large 
amount of financing, and the inherent uncertainties and 
risks would make it difficult to obtain this financing. 
Under the partnership option, the RE-GenCo would be 
able to share risk and to limit its financial stake to 
generation investment only.  
This study proposes a methodology for an RE-
GenCo and a merchant TransCo to negotiate a contract 
for securing the transmission needed to integrate the RE-
GenCo’s renewable generation into a power grid. It is 
assumed that the RE-GenCo pays a transmission rate to 
the TransCo to help compensate the TransCo for its 
transmission investment costs. Attention is focused on 
the determination of an appropriate transmission rate, 
the formulation of a negotiation process capable of 
handling uncertainties, and conditions under which no 
negotiated settlement can be reached.  
A Nash bargaining approach is employed to model 
the negotiation process. Nash bargaining is an important 
tool from cooperative game theory [16]. Unlike non-
cooperative game theory (e.g., Nash Equilibrium), Nash 
bargaining theory assumes that participants are able to 
bargain directly with each other to reach binding 
agreements. This assumption is appropriate for 
situations in which a small number of companies are 
bargaining over long-term investment decisions, because 
for such decisions it is natural for the companies to form 
a coalition and to select strategies beneficial to all. 
Cooperative game theory has been used in studies of 
electric power systems to develop transmission cost 
allocation methods. In this literature, the most 
commonly used cooperative solution concepts include 
the core, the kernel, the nucleolus, and the Shapley value 
[17-23]. These solution concepts are designed for 
transferable utility games in which each player can 
transfer part of its utility payoff to other players.  In 
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particular, the total utility payoff achieved by the 
members of a coalition can be divided among these 
members by means of utility transfers. Gately considers 
a problem of dividing gains and costs from transmission 
investment among various areas in the Southern 
Electricity Region of India [17]. The solution concept of 
the core is applied and several possible distributions in 
the core are examined for which each area’s propensity 
to disrupt is not too high. The core and the nucleolus are 
adopted in [18] to allocate fixed transmission costs to 
wheeling transactions. It is shown that many core 
outcomes exist; hence, the concept of a nucleolus 
outcome is introduced in order to obtain a unique 
solution by “minimizing the maximum regret”. A 
congestion cost allocation method that combines the 
marginal cost concept of nodal pricing and the Aumann-
Shapley mechanism is developed in [19] in order to 
obtain fair and economically efficient price signals for 
congestion management. As clarified in [20], the 
Shapley value assumes all orderings of players are 
equally likely and weights all players equally in order to 
obtain allocations that can be considered to be both fair 
and equitable. 
The Nash bargaining solution is a cooperative game 
concept that assumes utility transfers (side payments) 
are not possible. For example, in the Nash bargaining 
study at hand it is assumed to be unrealistic for the 
bargaining parties to make side payments; rather, the 
only payments made are for energy, renewable credits 
and other commodities traded through the market. As a 
result of this restriction, the Nash bargaining solution 
can be less efficient than solutions for transferable utility 
games, in the sense that a smaller sum of surpluses is 
obtained by the parties.  
The Nash bargaining solution does not attempt to 
maximize total utility; rather, it attempts to achieve a 
unique bargaining solution that is fair to each player in 
the following two senses.  First, equally situated players 
are treated equally. Second, Pareto efficiency is 
achieved; that is, there are no other solutions (in the 
absence of side payments) that can make at least one 
party better off without lessening the utility of at least 
one other party. Nash bargaining is particularly tractable 
for two-player bargaining games and has many real-life 
applications, e.g., contract negotiation [24]. 
For the negotiation process under consideration in 
this study, both the RE-GenCo and the TransCo have to 
make decisions based on their forecasts of electricity 
prices and RE production, and these forecasts will affect 
the bargaining result [25]. However, this will not 
prevent a successful negotiation outcome as long as each 
company is satisfied with its own expected profits based 
on its own forecasts. For simplicity, it is assumed in this 
study that the two companies share their forecasting 
information and form common price and production 
forecasts
1
.
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     A prerequisite for a successful negotiation is a 
sufficient profit margin for each company. If the 
expected generation revenue is inadequate to cover the 
investment, an incentive might be required to ensure the 
investment is made. However, if an incentive is needed, 
policy makers will have to consider whether an 
incentive is warranted from a broader system viewpoint 
and, if so, what form it should take
2
.
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 In this study, 
incentives in the form of RE subsidies are investigated 
and their effectiveness is assessed by comparing the 
results obtained from decentralized negotiation with RE 
subsidies to results obtained from a centralized 
transmission planning model with no RE subsidies. 
A case study is used to demonstrate how Nash 
bargaining ensures a fair and Pareto-efficient utility 
allocation for the bargaining participants. Thus, it can be 
used as a viable way to encourage merchant 
transmission investment. The findings also provide 
guidelines to policymakers regarding the advantages and 
limitations of RE subsidies as a means to facilitate RE 
integration.   
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. 
Sections II and III present the negotiation problem and 
apply Nash bargaining theory to this problem. In Section 
IV, a centralized transmission planning model is 
developed and used to evaluate RE subsidies. A six-bus 
case study is presented in Section V. Concluding 
remarks are given in Section VI. 
II.  PROBLEM FORMULATION 
A.  Overview 
This section describes the negotiation process 
between an RE-GenCo and a TransCo. It is assumed that 
the RE-GenCo has decided to invest in an RE generation 
unit g at a remote planned bus location n(g).   
Transmission is needed to transport the RE output from 
n(g) to a power grid, and the RE-GenCo has sought out 
a TransCo to undertake the needed transmission 
investment. The agreement with the TransCo includes a 
                                                          
1
If this assumption is relaxed and the companies use their own 
forecasts, the model needs to incorporate the impact of forecasting 
accuracy on each company’s utility function; see [16] for a treatment 
of a Nash bargaining problem in which this assumption is relaxed. 
2
Schumacher et al. [26] note that an incentive could be a policy 
initiative to promote transmission development. FERC also makes 
policies [27] for Merchant Transmission (MT) developers to hold 
auctions to attract and pre-subscribe some capacity to “anchor 
customers.” The incentive can be a monetary incentive, such as 
Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) that need to be purchased by 
LSEs to meet the RPS [28], or energy subsidies such as Investment 
Tax Credits (ITCs) and Production Tax Credits (PTCs). Given these 
forms of monetary incentives, RE-GenCos could gain an additional 
revenue stream that facilitates the negotiation process. 
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payment to be made by the RE-GenCo to the TransCo to 
cover the TransCo’s investment costs. Determination of 
this payment, measured by a payment rate   ($/MWh), 
necessitates a negotiation between the two parties. The 
negotiation result will determine the investment of the 
not-yet-built RE generation unit and transmission lines.  
To simplify the discussion, several assumptions are 
made. First, the terms of the agreement are expressed in 
annualized terms, i.e., for a typical year with annualized 
cost components. Second, maintenance costs are not 
explicitly modeled since they can be included as part of 
the annual capital investment (see the Appendix). Third, 
risk neutrality is assumed for the negotiation process, so 
that the expected utility (net benefit) levels attained by 
the RE-GenCo and the TransCo can be expressed in 
terms of expected profits without concern for profit 
variance. These simplifications can easily be relaxed. 
B.  Negotiation Process 
Two possible outcomes from the negotiation are 
either an agreement is reached or both parties walk away. 
An agreement is reached if the RE-GenCo can recover 
its generation investment costs and the TransCo can 
recover its transmission investment costs.  
Two cases are considered for the energy price.  In the 
first case, the energy price is assumed to be 
predetermined at a constant level FP ($/MWh) because 
the RE-GenCo has previously signed Power Purchase 
Agreements (PPAs) or other forms of bilateral contracts.  
This assumption is reasonable since, according to [29], 
various electric utilities have issued long-term PPAs 
with renewable energy developers. This common 
business practice could make it easier for RE-GenCos to 
finance RE projects. In the second case, the energy price 
is assumed to be determined by means of a market 
process.  
Consider the first case. Let SR ($/MWh) denote the 
subsidy payment received by the RE-GenCo per MW of 
RE it produces, and let   ($/MWh) denote the 
negotiated rate (to be determined) that the RE-GenCo 
applies to its RE production level to determine its 
payment to the TransCo. Then the expected utility of the 
risk-neutral RE-GenCo, considering a set 
S  of future 
possible power system scenarios s,
 
and calculated over a 
set 
T  of time subperiods (hours), is given by 
[[ ] ]
S
b
T g
G
RG s t R gb gbts RG
t b
GU E D FP S P IC 
 
          (1)    
In expression (1), Pgbts (MW) denotes the RE production 
level of the offered block b for the RE unit g during hour 
t in scenario s, The marginal RE production cost for 
block b in each hour h and each scenario s is assumed to 
be either commonly known or truthfully reported as the 
offer price 
G
gb  ($/MWh).  
Consider, instead, the second case. The expected 
utility (1) must now be modified to a market-based 
version M
RGU  that takes into account the market-based 
energy prices at n(g), i.e., the Locational Marginal 
Prices (LMPs) that would be determined at n(g) should 
the transmission line connecting n(g) to the power grid 
be constructed. This market-based version takes the 
form 
( )[[ ] ]S
b
T g
M G
RG s t n g ts R gb gbts RG
t b
GU E D LMP S P IC 
 
     
 (2) 
Note that the market-based energy prices can either be 
estimated by solving market-clearing problems or 
predicted using various forecasting methods [30].   
     For the TransCo, if an agreement is reached, its 
expected utility UT is given by its expected profit, taking 
into account its receipt from the RE-GenCo and its 
transmission investment costs. This expected utility 
takes the following form:  
[ ]
S
CT
T
G
T s t gts k k
t k
U E D P ICT Y
 
  
       
 (3)         
 where 
b
g
G G
gts gbts
b
P P

   reflects the total RE power produced 
by all blocks b from the RE unit g. 
If no agreement is reached, no investment will occur 
either in the RE generation unit or in the transmission 
line.  In this case the expected utilities of the RE-GenCo 
and the TransCo are their threat point outcomes (dRG , 
dT), which hereafter are set equal to (0,0) to reflect the 
assumption that both parties have zero cash positions 
prior to the negotiation
3
.
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The RE-GenCo and the TransCo are assumed to 
consider a set of possible transmission investment plans 
that includes no line, one line, or multiple lines 
connecting n(g) to the power grid. With knowledge of 
their expected utility functions, their threat points, and 
anticipated market conditions, the RE-GenCo and the 
TransCo initiate a negotiation process to determine (a) a 
transmission investment plan and (b) an associated 
transmission payment rate λ. The negotiation can be 
based on projected revenue from the long term PPAs, or 
on the results (i.e., LMPs, generation dispatch levels, 
and transmission power flows) of an ISO market 
operation as depicted in Fig.1.  
Note that the negotiated rate is only settled after the 
RE generation unit and transmission line go live for 
operation. In order to avoid any unnecessary agreement 
default or untrue information report, settlement 
approaches could be designed carefully by the two 
companies, such as how to monitor and track the RE 
                                                          
4 3As will be seen in Section III, the outcome for the Nash 
Bargaining negotiation process for the RE-GenCo and TransCo is not 
affected by this threat-point assumption.  Any non-zero initial cash 
positions held by the RE-GenCo and the TransCo would have to be 
added both to their expected utility functions and to their threat points.  
These cash positions would then cancel out in the formulation of the 
objective function for the Nash Bargaining problem. 
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production, or how an ISO might oversee the execution 
of the final settlement. 
 
 
 Fig. 1. Negotiation between the RE-GenCo and the TransCo 
C.    Policy implications for RE subsidies 
 Traditionally, policymakers promoted transmission 
plans for the benefit of all system participants. In 
today’s market-based environment, however, 
policymakers do not have full control of transmission 
plan development. Nevertheless, policymakers can use 
incentives or subsidies in an attempt to steer a negotiated 
merchant transmission plan towards a preferred plan. 
Specifically, the RE subsidy payment SR enters into 
the determination of expected utility for both the RE-
GenCo and the TransCo. Thus, policymakers could 
adjust SR in an attempt to encourage the RE-GenCo and 
TransCo to agree on a transmission plan that benefits all 
system participants and not just themselves. In Section 
IV this study will explore the possibility of using SR to 
ensure such a system-optimal transmission investment 
plan. 
III.  NEGOTIATION: A NASH BARGAINING APPROACH 
This section models the negotiation process between 
the RE-GenCo and the TransCo as a two-player Nash 
bargaining problem using both analytical and numerical 
formulations. 
A.  Nash Bargaining 
Research on two-player bargaining problems was 
initiated by John Nash [31], [32]. Nash assumed that 
two players are in a negotiation to determine an outcome 
from among a compact convex set of possible (expected) 
utility outcomes in R
2
, referred to as the utility 
possibility set U. If the players fail to agree on a 
settlement point 1 2( , )u u u in U, they obtain a default 
“no settlement” outcome d = (d1,d2) in U, referred to as 
the players’ threat point.  The barter set B(U,d) is the 
set of all u in U satisfying u d .   
Let D denote the collection of all bargaining 
problems (U,d).  Nash proved that there exists a unique 
function 2:f D R mapping each bargaining problem 
(U,d) into a solution
1 2( , ) ( ( , ), ( , )f U d f U d f U d ) in 
B(U,d) that satisfies the following four axioms. 
 Axiom 1: Invariance under Positive Linear-Affine 
Transformation.  For any real-valued monotonic 
linear-affine function H defined over U, f(H(U),H(d)) 
= H(f(U,d)).  
 Axiom 2: Symmetry.  If
1 2d d , and if 1 2( , )u u U  
if and only if
2 1( , )u u U , then 1 2( , ) ( , )f U d f U d , 
implying that the solution should provide equal gains 
from cooperation.  
 Axiom 3: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. 
Given ( , )U d and ( , )U d withU U  , if ( , )f U d U  , 
then f(U,d) = f(U’,d) , implying that the solution 
f(U,d) in U is not affected by the presence of the 
“irrelevant” alternatives in the complement set U’/U.  
 Axiom 4: Pareto Efficiency. If u and u  are elements 
of U for a given (U, d), and u u  , then ( , )f U d u , 
implying Pareto-efficiency of the solution.  
     Nash constructively demonstrated that his unique 
bargaining function f(U,d) can be obtained as follows: 
1 2 1 2
1 2
1 1 2 2
( , ) ( , )
( , )
( , ) maximize      ( )( )
u u d d
u u U
f U d arg u d u d


  
     
(4)             
The objective function in (4) is now referred to as the 
Nash Product (NP) of the (expected) utility outcomes 
for the two players. The solution to (4) is referred to as a 
Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), an important solution 
concept in cooperative game theory due to its simple, 
intuitively appealing form and the fairness and 
efficiency properties assured by Axioms 1-4.  
Specifically, the fairness and efficiency properties of 
Axioms 1-4 can be explained as follows. The first axiom 
asserts that the bargaining method should not result in 
an outcome that depends on the precise “units” that the 
players use to represent their preference orders over 
outcomes. A player’s preference order over outcomes is 
unaffected by a monotonic linear-affine transformation 
of his (expected) utility function, hence the bargaining 
outcome should also be invariant to such a 
transformation.   
Axiom 2 asserts that players with equal threat points 
who have an equal opportunity to achieve utility 
outcomes (i.e., their utility possibility set is symmetric) 
should achieve the same utility outcome under the 
bargaining method. That is, the bargaining method 
should not advantage either player relative to the other 
under these conditions, since the two players are 
essentially identical. 
The third axiom states that irrelevant alternatives 
should not have any impact on the bargaining result. For 
example, if two options {T1, T2} are under 
consideration, and both players prefer T2 to T1, then 
adding a third option T3 that is “irrelevant” (not 
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preferred to either T1 or T2) should not change their 
preferences between T1 and T2. This also holds for the 
removal of an irrelevant alternative. If the two players 
choose T2 among three options {T1, T2, T3}, then they 
should still choose T2 if the “irrelevant” option T3 is 
removed from consideration. 
The fourth axiom ensures the efficiency of the 
bargaining method, in the sense that “utility” is not 
wasted. The bargaining method guarantees that 
bargaining will not cease while there is still a feasible 
way to increase the utility of one player without hurting 
the utility of the other player.  
The NB formulation can easily be extended to n-
person bargaining games with substantially weaker 
requirements on sets and functional forms.  For example, 
compactness and convexity of the utility possibility sets 
U in R
2
 is not needed to ensure the existence of a unique 
NB solution function 2:f D R  that satisfies Axioms 1-
4. Rather, as established in [26], it suffices that each 
derived Barter Set B(U,d) in R
2
 is “corner concave,” 
meaning (roughly) that it has a closed, bounded, and 
concave Pareto-efficient frontier. Empirical evidence in 
support of NB theory has been obtained from human-
subject bargaining experiments [35]. 
B.  Bargaining on RE Interconnection: A Simple 
Illustrative Analytical Model 
A relatively simple analytical model is used in this 
section to provide basic intuitive insights regarding the 
negotiation process. Parameters and functional forms are 
represented in per-hour units; the extension to longer 
periods of time is straightforward. Also, the 
consideration of transmission constraints is deferred 
until later sections.  
Suppose the pro-rated hourly construction cost for an 
RE generation unit in a remote area is C0 ($/MWh). The 
maximum available power output of the RE unit is 
denoted by r (MW).  To recognize the variability of this 
RE resource, r is modeled as a random variable with 
probability density function (pdf) g(r) and cumulative 
density function (cdf) G(r).  The model also assumes a 
constant RE marginal production cost CR ($/MWh) and a 
constant RE subsidy SR ($/MWh). 
The RE-GenCo seeks out a merchant TransCo to 
invest in one or more transmission lines to deliver its RE 
output PR (MW) to distant load centers. The pro-rated 
hourly transmission investment cost is represented by CT   
($/MWh). The sales price for RE is represented by a 
fixed payment DR ($/MWh), interpreted to be the RE 
strike price that the RE-GenCo has assured for itself 
through some previously contracted PPA. The two 
parties enter into a negotiation in an attempt to reach an 
agreement on a payment rate  ($/MWh)
 
and a 
transmission capacity FT (MW).  Note that the RE output 
PR is limited by the lower of the maximum available 
output r and the transmission capacity FT: 
{ , }R TP min r F                                (5)  
     Using these representations, if an agreement is 
reached, the RE-GenCo’s expected utility is its expected 
profit 
0[ ]R R R R Ru EP D S C C                        (6)                 
and the TransCo’s expected utility is given as  
T R T Tu EP F C                            (7)  
If no agreement is reached, the outcome is the threat 
point for the RE-GenCo and TransCo, assumed to be 
given by (0, 0). Extension to an intertemporal 
optimization problem is taken up in Section III.C, below. 
The RE-GenCo and TransCo are assumed to use a 
Nash bargaining process for their negotiation. 
Specifically, it is assumed they have agreed to try to 
determine solutions for the decision variables  and 
TF  
by solving the following Nash bargaining problem: 
,max ( , ) ( , )TF R T T TNP u F u F            (8) 
subject to 0Ru   and 0Tu  .      
     Assuming a solution exists for (8) with non-binding 
inequality constraints (i.e., a solution satisfying uR > 0 
and uT > 0), the initial solution step is to take the first 
order derivatives of NP with respect to   and
TF , 
R T
T R
u uNP
u u
  
 
 
  
                 (9) 
R T
T R
T T T
u uNP
u u
F F F
 
 
  
               (10) 
Using (5), ( , )R r TEP E min r F  and when r>FT, 
min{r,FT}=FT; and when  Tr F , min{r,FT}=r. Using 
integration by parts, the expected RE output can thus be 
written as 
0
· ( ) | ( )
T
T
F
R T T r F TEP F Pr r F E F G rr r d             (11) 
From (11), the partial derivative of 
REP with respect 
to 
TF can be expressed as 
1 ( )R T
T
EP
G F
F

 

                      (12) 
The partial derivative of uR and uT with respect to λ and 
FT can then be obtained as  
/R Ru EP                         (13) 
/ [1 ( )] [ ]R T T R R Ru F G F D S C               (14) 
/T Ru EP                   
 (15) 
/ [1 ( )]T T T Tu F G F C       
         (16) 
Inserting equations (13) and (15) into equation (9) and 
setting it to zero, which is a first-order necessary 
condition for (8) to have an interior solution, the 
following condition can be derived: 
[ ] 0R R TEP u u                          (17) 
Since the expected RE output EPR is normally positive, 
(17) will typically only be satisfied when 
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R Tu u                              (18) 
This is a logical outcome, implying that the participants’ 
are equalized if an agreement is reached.   
     Inserting equations (14), (16) and (18) into equation 
(10) and setting it to zero, which is another first order 
necessary condition for (8) to have an interior solution,  
it is found that 
 
             [[1 ( )] 0[ ]]T R R R T TG F D S uCC            (19) 
Since 0Tu  is assumed for this interior solution, the 
resulting transmission capacity
TF  
can be solved for as 
follows: 
1 1 TT
R R R
C
F G
D S C
    
            
   (20)  
Substituting equations (6) and (7) into equation (18), the 
solution for  is found to be:  
0
2 2
T TR R R
R
C F CD S C
EP

 
                (21) 
As seen above, the negotiated payment rate λ and 
investment transmission capacity FT can be explicitly 
characterized for this model under RE output uncertainty, 
assuming an interior solution to (8) exists. Inserting (20) 
and (21) into the expected utility expressions (6) and (7), 
the following explicit expression is obtained for 
equation (18): 
   
0[ ] ] / 2[T R R R RR T Tu Cu EP D S C F C        (22)  
Given FT, the associated transmission plan can be 
determined. Since the transmission investment is lumpy 
in nature, the transmission plan is likely to consist of a 
set of discrete transmission candidates. The selection of 
certain particular transmission candidates from this set 
will be discussed in the following subsection.   
C.  Bargaining on RE Interconnection: Detailed 
Formulation 
Consider, now, a fuller modeling of this bargaining 
process that takes transmission and generation 
constraints into consideration.  As before, an RE-GenCo 
and a TransCo are interested in negotiating an 
agreement under which the TransCo builds one or more 
transmission lines to connect the RE-GenCo’s unit to the 
power grid.  However, this bargaining process now takes 
place within a power system with multiple conventional 
and RE generators and with conventional energy prices 
determined through an ISO-managed optimal power 
flow optimization.   
As shown in Fig. 1, the bargaining process is 
formulated as a two-level intertemporal optimization 
problem with investment costs expressed on an 
annualized rather than hourly basis. The upper-level 
problem consists of a Nash bargaining problem between 
the RE-GenCo and TransCo conditional on a collection 
of lower-level problems, one for each hour t and each 
scenario s, where s reflects RE uncertainties such as 
variable wind speed.  Each lower-level problem 
represents the operations of an ISO-managed market (for 
a particular hour t in a particular scenario s) using a 
standard DC optimal power flow formulation to derive 
LMPs, generation dispatch levels, and transmission line 
power flows. 
The detailed formulation for this two-level 
optimization problem is presented below, where the RE-
GenCo’s expected utility 
RGU and the TransCo's 
expected utility 
TU across possible scenarios s in S and 
hours t in 
T  are given by (2) and (3).  
,
max
k
RG T
Y
UU


            
             (23) 
subject to  
0RGU                                      (24) 
 0TU                                      (25) 
CT CT
k k
k k
M Y M Y
 
                        (26) 
where  , ,Ggbts T SP t s      
   max
G L L b G b
ibts jbts n j i
L L G G
jb jbts ib ibts
P P j b i b
arg P P 
   
            (27) 
Subject to   
| ( ) | ( )
0,   ( ),
L b
n j
G b
n i
L
jbts kts kts
k o k n k r k nj b
G
ibts nts N
i b
P F F
P LMP n
  
 
 
   
   
 
         (28) 
0 , ,G G TG bibts ib iP P i b                (29) 
 0 , ,G G RG bibts ibts iP P i b              (30) 
( ) ( )
1
[ ], ETkts o k ts r k ts
k
F k
X
               (31) 
, ETk kts kF F F k                       (32) 
( ) ( )
1
(1 ) [ ]
                           (1 ) ,
k kts o k ts r k ts
k
CT
k
Y M F
X
Y M k
     
   
           (33) 
, CTk k kts k kY F F Y F k               (34) 
The upper level problem, consisting of equations 
(23)-(26), reflects the requirements of the Nash 
bargaining problem. Inequality (26) (with an arbitrarily 
large constant M) ensures a zero payment rate λ if no 
transmission line investment is made and an essentially 
unrestricted range for the payment rate if it is made.  
Each lower-level problem consists of equations (27)-
(34) for a particular hour t and scenario s. The objective 
(27) of this lower-level problem is to maximize total net 
surplus from market operations. Constraints (28) enforce 
real power balance at each bus n; the associated shadow 
price for each bus n then determines the LMP for bus n. 
Constraints (29) and (30) impose generation capacity 
limits on conventional and RE generating units, 
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respectively. Note that the maximum generation 
capacity G
ibtsP  for each RE unit i varies in hours and 
scenarios, allowing for the variability of the RE resource. 
Constraints (31) and (32)(31) enforce transmission line 
limits for existing transmission lines. Constraints (33) 
and (34) enforce transmission line limits for any 
candidate transmission lines that are to be built. When 
line k is selected for construction (Yk=1), the 
transmission limit for line k is enforced. When line k is 
not selected for construction (Yk=0), the two constraints 
are essentially removed (or inactive). 
This formulation can be modified to consider 
market-based RE prices (LMPs). If the RE-GenCo has 
no PPAs or other bilateral contracts, its expected utility 
function in (23) can be replaced by MRGU  given in 
equation (2). In addition to the RE production Pgbts, the 
RE-GenCo’s expected utility MRGU  now is also 
determined by another model variable – the RE market 
price LMPn(g)ts, which is the shadow price of constraint 
(28) and solved in the lower-level ISO market operation 
problem. The LMPs depends on the electricity supply 
and demand, and also on the system network topology, 
which in turn is affected by the transmission investment 
agreement between the RE-GenCo and the TransCo with 
which it is negotiating. 
Note that the above formulation is focused only on 
transmission investment. In reality, however, generation 
and transmission investments are closely related and 
should be considered as two inseparable components in 
the bargaining process. Joint decision-making for 
merchant generation and transmission investment is 
discussed in the Appendix. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR RENEWABLE SUBSIDY POLICY 
    In this section a centralized transmission planning 
model is developed as a benchmark for comparison. The 
planning objective is to maximize the net benefit for all 
power system participants, including LSEs that are not 
participants in the  negotiation between the RE-GenCo 
and TransCo. The purpose is to determine if the 
negotiated solution outlined in Section III can be steered 
towards the system-optimal solution via an RE subsidy. 
A.  Centralized Planning and Policy Implications 
In a traditional integrated resource planning process, 
a centralized planner would determine a transmission 
plan to deliver the output of an RE unit. Let BR ($/MWh) 
be the per-MWh benefit from RE. Similar to Section 
III.B, the model built below represents a slice-in-time 
snapshot of system operations, e.g., for a peak-load hour. 
It can be extended to longer time periods with time 
varying BR. 
The centralized planner needs to determine the 
necessary transmission capacity FT to maximize the 
expected system net benefits SS: 
maximize   
T
R R R R T T
F
SS EP B EP C F C     (35)  
where the notation in (35) is the same as used in Section 
III.B. Taking the derivative of SS with respect to FT, and 
setting it equal to 0, gives 
0 [1 ( )][ ]T R R TG F B C C                  (36)  
FT can then be solved for explicitly as follows: 
1 1 TT
R R
C
F G
B C
    
 
                   (37) 
Comparing the negotiated solution (20) with the 
centralized solution (37), it is conceivable that the RE 
subsidy payment SR in (20) can be adjusted to steer the 
negotiated solution towards the optimal solution.  In 
particular, equating (20) and (37), we obtain 
R R RS B D                           (38) 
Equation (38) indicates that the optimal RE subsidy 
payment should be set equal to the difference between 
the benefit from consuming RE and the payment for 
purchasing it. 
Certainly, determining the benefit BR is not a trivial 
task. In a market environment, it could be simply 
modeled as bid prices or the willingness to pay for 
renewable energy. In a broader sense, it could also 
include environmental benefits and other non-monetary 
benefits.  Also, in practice, the impact of system 
operation conditions such as transmission flows and 
market prices should be considered (see Section IV.B, 
below). 
Nevertheless, this closed-form result could be used 
as a rule of thumb for policymakers to design RE 
subsidies, and to establish a subsidy mechanism that 
provides merchant investors with sufficient market 
incentives for achieving optimal transmission 
investment plans.  
B.   Centralized Planning: A Detailed Formulation 
A more detailed formulation of the centralized 
planning model with uncertainties and realistic 
constraints is presented below: 
, ,
maximize          [
                        ]
G L S
L bibts jbts k
T j
b CT
G i
L L
s t jb jbts
P P Y
t j b
G G
ib ibts k k
i b k
E D P
P ICT Y



  
  
 
  
  
   (39) 
subject to,  , ,T St s     constraints (28)-(34). 
    The objective is to maximize expected system net 
benefits SS consisting of operational net earnings net of 
the transmission investment cost. The operational 
constraints are identical with equations (28)-(34) 
appearing in the negotiation model.   
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Fig. 2. Garver’s six-bus test case 
V.  NUMERICAL RESULTS 
A.  Six-Bus Test Case 
This subsection provides a detailed formulation for 
the negotiation of an RE interconnection using a six-bus 
test case developed by Garver [36].  As seen in Fig. 2, 
this test case comprises five existing buses {B1,…,B5}, 
six existing transmission lines (solid black), five loads 
{L1,…,L5}, two conventional generators {G1,G2}, and 
one RE-GenCo located at a potential Bus 6.  The RE-
GenCo is assumed to have a single wind generation unit 
(WG3). In order to deliver the RE-GenCo’s wind power 
to the grid, one or more transmission lines need to be 
constructed (dotted blue lines).   
The supply offer and demand bid data for the two 
conventional generators and the five loads are given in 
Table I in block form.  For example, G1’s supply offer 
consists of three quantity blocks 200 (MW), 100 (MW), 
and 100 (MW), with corresponding block prices given 
by $21/MWh, $23/MWh, and $28/MWh.  
Table II provides the RE-GenCo’s cost and 
operational data.  The third column gives the RE-
GenCo’s generation investment cost ICRG ($). The 
fourth column gives the RE-GenCo’s marginal 
production cost ($/MWh), assumed to be constant.  The 
fifth column gives Prate (MW), the nameplate capacity of 
the RE-GenCo’s wind unit WG3. As in [5], the 
maximum possible output Pmax of this wind unit is 
determined as a non-linear function of wind speed v and 
Prate conditional on three parameters: cut-in, cut-out, and 
rated wind speed Vci (m/s), Vco (m/s) and Vrate (m/s). This 
function is given by 
0 0
( ) / ( )
0
ci
rate ci rate ci ci rate
max
rate rate co
c
v v
P v V V V V v V
P
P V v V
V o v
 
    
 
 
         
(40) 
 
 
TABLE I. CONVENTIONAL GENERATOR AND LOAD DATA 
 Conventional Generators Loads 
Bus G Off. Size 
(MW) 
Off. 
Price 
($/MWh) 
L Bid Size 
(MW) 
Bid Price 
($/MWh) 
1 G1 [200;100; 
100] 
[21;23; 
28] 
L1 [40;40] [43;30] 
2    L2 [80;80;80] [54;50;48] 
3 G2 [210;210; 
140] 
[30;34; 
43] 
L3 [20;20] [30;26] 
4    L4 [80;80] [45;32] 
5    L5 [80;80;80] [50;42;30] 
 
TABLE II. WIND UNIT DATA 
Bus Name 
Invest. 
Cost 
(106$)  
 Prod.  
Cost 
Prate Vci Vrate Vco 
6 WG3 10 2 600 4 10 22 
In actual transmission planning, a set of feasible 
transmission line candidates is typically screened based 
on reliability studies [29]. Table III presents the data for 
five existing (T1-T5) denoted as type E and five 
candidate (T6-T10) transmission lines denoted as type C. 
Each of the five candidate lines connects Bus 6 to the 
grid. The investment cost is calculated as the product of 
the line capacity and the per-unit cost at a given voltage 
level, tower construction and conductor configuration 
[30]. The data given in Table III are a function of the 
line capacity for each transmission line. The pattern of 
transmission costs also reflects economies of scale, e.g., 
building one 300-MW line between Buses 2 and 6 is less 
expensive than building two 150MW lines connecting 
these buses.  
To accommodate the variability of the wind unit 
WG3, three wind speed scenarios are constructed for 
four subperiods in a year, which are represented by four 
seasons with equal time duration, i.e., 
1/ 4 8760 2190h h  .  The seasonal wind speeds (m/s) 
that characterize each scenario are given in Table IV.  
For each wind speed scenario, the maximum possible 
output of the wind unit in each season is calculated 
using (40).  Note that the wind unit can normally 
generate more RE during the Fall and Winter due to 
ample wind resources. 
TABLE III. TRANSMISSION LINE DATA 
Name 
From 
Bus 
To 
Bu
s 
Reactance 
( ) 
Limit 
(MW) 
Cost 
($106)  
Type 
T1 1 2 0.4 250 - E 
T2 1 4 0.6 220 - E 
T3 1 5 0.2 300 - E 
T4 2 3 0.2 300 - E 
T5 3 5 0.2 300 - E 
T6 2 6 0.3 150 8.0 C 
T7 2 6 0.15 300 13 C 
T8 3 6 0.4 150 9.2 C 
T9 3 6 0.3 200 10 C 
T10 4 6 0.3 200 11 C 
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TABLE IV.  SEASONAL WIND SPEEDS (M/S) FOR THREE 
WIND SPEED SCENARIOS 
Scenario Spring Summer Fall Winter 
S1=High wind 7 5 10 9 
S2=Medium wind 5 5 8 9 
S3=Low wind 2 1 5 8 
B.  Negotiated Solution with Fixed RE Price FP 
Consider the high-wind scenario S1 in Table IV 
under the assumption that the RE-GenCo has signed a 
PPA that fixes the price of its RE at the constant level 
FP=$12/MWh. The case in which the RE price is 
instead determined through a market process is 
discussed below in Section V.C.  
Suppose that no subsidies are available for wind 
energy, i.e., SR=0. The RE-GenCo and the TransCo now 
get together to negotiate how to invest in transmission. 
However, after engaging in Nash bargaining over the set 
of feasible transmission plans consisting of all possible 
combinations of the transmission lines listed in Table III 
(i.e., solving the Nash bargaining problem (23)-(34) for 
these plans), it is determined that none of these plans 
ensures each company a nonnegative expected utility 
gain, i.e., an expected utility level at least as great as 
their threat point.  The negotiation thus breaks down and 
no transmission lines are built.   
An alternative way to try to achieve an agreement in 
this no-subsidy circumstance is for the RE-GenCo to 
sign a long-term PPA with a higher strike price FP prior 
to initiating the Nash bargaining process. Table V 
reports outcomes for a series of Nash bargaining games 
with successively increased FP levels, starting with 
FP=$12/MWh. 
Specifically, it is seen in Table V that the RE-GenCo 
and the TransCo are successfully able to negotiate more 
transmission line investment as FP increases, with 
accompanying increases in the transmission payment 
rate λ and their expected utility gains. Note, in 
particular, that the RE-GenCo and the TransCo achieve 
equal expected utility gains for each tested FP level.    
This utility outcome is consistent with equation (18), 
established for the analytical model, and illustrates the 
fairness and efficiency of the Nash bargaining solution. 
 
TABLE V. FP-BASED NEGOTIATED OUTCOMES FOR THE 
HIGH WIND SPEED SCENARIO WITH SR=0 AND VARYING FP 
LEVELS 
FP 
($/MWh) 
Line 
Investment 
λ 
($/MWh) 
UT 
(106$) 
URG 
(106$) 
12 None 0 0 0 
17 T7  8.434  0.545 0.545 
22 T6,T7 12.644   5.300 5.300 
27 T6,T7 15.144 10.506   10.506 
 
If the PPA contract price FP is fixed at $12/MWh, 
another way to encourage the two companies to come to 
an agreement on a transmission plan is through an 
appropriate RE subsidy SR approved by policymakers. 
To explore how the SR level affects the negotiation, 
experiments were conducted with an initial subsidy of SR 
= $5/MWh that was then successively increased in 
increments of $5/MWh. The resulting negotiated 
transmission plan, payment rate, and expected utility 
gains are reported in Table VI. 
TABLE VI. FP-BASED NEGOTIATED OUTCOMES FOR THE 
HIGH WIND SPEED SCENARIO WITH FP=$12/MWh AND 
VARYING SR LEVELS 
SR 
($/MWh) 
Line 
Investment 
λ 
($/MWh) 
UT 
(106$) 
URG 
(106$) 
 5 T7     8.434   0.545   0.545 
10 T6, T7 12.644   5.300   5.300 
15 T6, T7 15.144 10.506 10.506 
Observe that, when SR=$5/MWh and FP=$12/MWh, 
the selected transmission plan is T7. In the resulting 
settlement the RE-GenCo agrees to pay the TransCo 
λ=$8.43/MWh for recovering the cost of the 
transmission investment for the candidate line T7, and 
the expected utility gain for each company is $545,000. 
These negotiated results are exactly the same as the 
results reported in Table V for FP=$17/MWh. This 
phenomenon is observed across the two tables. This 
indicates that an increase in the subsidy payment SR can 
substitute for an increase in the FP. This substitutability 
is clarified by an examination of equation (1), where it is 
seen that FP and SR play similar roles in determining the 
expected utility levels of the two companies.  
Tables V and VI also show that a small $5/MWh 
increase in FP or SR can result in up to a $5,000,000 
increase in the expected utility gains for the two 
companies. Thus, even a small price incentive can play a 
very important role in encouraging RE transmission 
investment. Finally, Table VI shows that higher RE 
subsidies result in more transmission lines being 
constructed. A more detailed sensitivity analysis 
expanding upon these results is presented below in 
Section V.E.  
C.  Negotiated Solution with Market-Based LMPs 
The previous section explores the FP-based case in 
which the RE-GenCo (wind producer) at Bus 6 enters 
into a PPA to ensure in advance a fixed wind-power 
price FP.  However, some US ISO-managed energy 
regions (e.g., MISO) now permit wind producers to 
offer their wind power into a day-ahead market and 
receive LMP payments in a market settlement.   
It is therefore of interest to investigate in this section 
the LMP-based case in which market-based LMPs for 
both wind power and conventional generation are 
determined through the centralized market process 
represented by (27)-(34).  The RE-GenCo then uses the 
market-based expected utility function MRGU  in (2) in its 
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negotiation with the TransCo for determination of a 
transmission plan. 
In particular, consider the high wind speed scenario 
S1 in Table IV for the LMP-based case under the 
assumption that no RE subsidy is available. Table VII 
displays the negotiated outcomes that result for the RE-
GenCo and the TransCo from an application of the Nash 
bargaining process (23)-(34) with LMPs for both wind 
power and conventional generation determined in the 
lower-level problem through a market process.  
Surprisingly, Table VII shows that the two 
companies are able to reach an agreement under this 
LMP-based negotiation even without an RE subsidy.  
The negotiated outcome is a transmission plan that calls 
for the construction of three new lines: namely, two new 
lines T6 and T7 to connect Bus 2 to the wind-unit Bus 6, 
and one new line T9 to connect the wind-unit Bus 6 to 
Bus 3. Under this plan each company attains the same 
expected utility gain, $6,072,000. This again 
demonstrates the fairness and Pareto-efficiency of the 
Nash bargaining approach.    
TABLE VII.  LMP-BASED NEGOTIATED OUTCOMES FOR THE 
HIGH WIND SPEED SCENARIO WITH NO RE SUBSIDY 
SR 
($/MWh) 
Line 
Investment 
λ 
($/MWh) 
UT 
(106$) 
URG 
(106$) 
0 T6,T7,T9 16.4 6.072 6.072 
 
Fig.3. FP-based case: Bus 6 LMPs and wind dispatch levels by 
season for the high wind speed scenario with FP = $12/MWh 
and SR = $15/MWh  (implemented negotiated transmission 
plan: T6 and T7) 
 
 
Fig.4. LMP-based case:  Bus 6 LMPs and wind dispatch levels 
by season for the high wind speed scenario with SR = 0  
(implemented negotiated transmission plan: T6, T7 and T9) 
It is interesting to compare the differences in 
outcomes between the FP-based case in which the price 
of wind-power is set in advance at a contracted price FP 
and the LMP-based case in which the price of wind 
power is determined through a centralized LMP-based 
market process.  Fig. 3 reports seasonal outcomes for the 
FP-based negotiation, and Fig. 4 reports seasonal 
outcomes for the LMP-based negotiation.  In both 
figures, the maximum RE (wind) outputs are computed 
based on the seasonal wind speeds for the high wind 
speed scenario S1 in Table IV.  
As seen in Figs. 3 and 4, the Bus 6 LMPs and wind 
dispatch outcomes for the two cases do not differ 
substantially for the Spring and Summer seasons.  In 
these seasons the wind unit, unconstrained by 
transmission limits, produces power at its maximum 
possible levels (300MW and 100MW). Consequently, 
for both the FP-based and LMP-based cases, the wind 
unit is dispatched as an infra-marginal unit, and the 
LMP at Bus 6 is determined by marginal generation 
units (e.g., $30/MWh by G2).  
On the other hand, outcomes do differ substantially 
for the Fall and Winter seasons.  For the FP-based case, 
the wind unit is constrained by transmission limits and 
so cannot produce to its full capacity. Consequently, the 
wind unit is a marginal unit whose marginal cost 
($2/MWh) determines the LMP at its own Bus 6. In 
contrast, for the LMP-based case, due to 
“overinvestment” in the three lines T6, T7, and T9, the 
wind unit is not constrained by transmission limits and 
hence is dispatched at maximum capacity.  The LMP at 
Bus 6 is therefore determined by the marginal cost of G1, 
a marginal generator that has a much higher marginal 
cost than the wind unit. 
More generally, for all three wind-speed scenarios 
given in Table IV, the LMP-based case with SR=0 
results in a Nash bargaining solution in which the RE-
GenCo and the TransCo agree to construct three new 
transmission lines: T6, T7, and T9.  By investing in 
these three new lines, it is guaranteed that the wind 
unit’s generation will never be constrained by 
transmission limits and hence will always be dispatched 
at its maximum output level.  In consequence, the wind 
unit will never be marginal and hence will never set the 
LMP at any bus. In particular, the LMP at the RE-
GenCo’s Bus 6 will be set by the marginal cost of more 
expensive conventional marginal generation.  As a result, 
the RE-GenCo will have a much higher expected utility 
(profit) level than if the LMP at Bus 6 was set at its own 
low marginal cost.  This high expected utility gain 
makes it worthwhile for the RE-GenCo to build the 
three new transmission lines.  
D.  Centralized Transmission Planning 
For the simple analytical modeling of centralized 
transmission planning presented in Section IV.A, it was 
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shown that the RE subsidy SR can be set to ensure that 
the negotiated transmission plan solution coincides with 
the system-optimal centralized solution. This section 
examines the possibility of adjusting the RE subsidy to 
achieve this goal for the more comprehensive 
formulation (39) of a centralized transmission planning 
problem presented in Section IV.B.  
The system-optimal transmission plan (
CY ) that 
solves the centralized optimization problem (39) is 
represented in Table VIII by indicating the inclusion (or 
not) of a line k in the plan by a designation of a 1 (or 0) 
value for a corresponding indicator function Yk. As 
shown, the system-optimal plan is to invest in the two 
candidate lines T6 and T7 in order to maximize expected 
system net benefits (SS).  
 
 TABLE VIII.SYSTEM-OPTIMAL TRANSMISSION PLAN YC 
Candidate Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 
Decision 1 1 0 0 0 
 
The system-optimal plan 
CY  is independent of any 
subsidy policy; the central planner directly selects an 
optimal transmission plan to maximize SS, and this 
selection then results in a particular distribution of gains 
across market participants. By construction, then, no 
other planning approach can achieve higher SS than 
centralized planning. Therefore, centralized planning is 
suggested as the most efficient approach when the 
renewable generation and transmission companies are 
under regulation and there is a reasonable level of 
certainty regarding both prices and renewable energy 
output. For example, this situation may occur when 
production subsidies are already set and relatively stable, 
and renewable energy producers have priority in energy 
dispatch and need not compete with other power 
producers. 
In general, however, centralized planning is not 
practical due to its high information requirements in 
market environment.  The issue is then whether a more 
practical decentralized negotiation approach can be 
found that results in transmission plan solutions which 
approximate the system-optimal transmission plan 
CY   to 
a satisfactory degree.  The following subsection 
addresses this issue. 
E.  RE Subsidy Sensitivity Analysis 
Table IX compares the SS outcomes (10
6
$) achieved 
under three different transmission planning approaches.  
These three approaches are as follows:  centralized 
planning (YC) for various SR values; FP-based 
negotiation (YN) for various SR values, given 
FP=$12/MWh; and LMP-based negotiation ( M
NY ) for 
various SR values.   
When SR is small, FP-based negotiation (YN) results 
in a relatively low SS outcome due to underinvestment 
relative to
CY ; no lines are selected to be built when SR=0 
and only line T7 is selected to be built when 
SR=$5/MWh. As SR increases, however, FP-based 
negotiation eventually results in a transmission plan that 
coincides with 
CY  and achieves the same SS as 
centralized planning.   
TABLE IX. EXPECTED SYSTEM NET BENEFITS (SS) UNDER 
THREE DIFFERENT TRANSMISSION PLANS AS SR INCREASES  
SR 
NY  
M
NY  CY  
0 0 136.39 142.55 
5 137.96 136.39 142.55 
10 142.55 136.39 142.55 
15 142.55 136.39 142.55 
When SR is $5/MWh, LMP-based negotiation (
M
NY ) 
results in an even lower SS outcome than FP-based 
negotiation (
NY ) 
due to overinvestment relative to
CY  
(investment in lines T6, T7 and T9).  Moreover, 
increases in SR have no impact on this suboptimal choice 
of plan.  In fact, as will now be shown in greater detail, 
the ability to move negotiated transmission plans closer 
to centrally-determined system-optimal transmission 
plan through changes in SR is very limited for the LMP-
based case.  
Additional sensitivity results for varying RE subsidy 
levels SR are reported in Table X and Table XI for the 
FP-based case (with FP=$12/MWh) and the LMP-based 
case, respectively.  Corresponding outcomes for the 
payment rate λ are depicted in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. Note 
that this sensitivity study includes negative SR values 
representing penalties rather than subsides for 
generating RE. Negative SR values can arise from cost 
overruns, high financial charges on capital, or costs 
incurred from project delays.  
     As indicated in Table X, FP-based negotiation fails 
to result in any transmission plan agreement when SR is 
between -$10/MWh and $4/MWh; the two parties 
default to their threat points. When SR is between 
$7/MWh and $41/MWh, FP-based negotiation results in 
the system-optimal plan 
CY   = [1 1 0 0 0] and hence also 
in maximum SS.  When SR increases above $42/MWh, 
however, FP-based negotiation results in too much 
transmission investment (relative to
CY  ) and hence in an 
SS outcome that is below maximum possible SS. 
TABLE X. FP-BASED TRANSMISSION PLAN OUTCOMES 
(FP=$12/MWh) FOR VARIOUS SUBSIDY LEVELS SR IN 
COMPARISON TO THE SYSTEM-OPTIMAL SOLUTION YC 
SR  
($/MWh) 
Candidate Match 
Yc? Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 
-10 to 4 0 0 0 0 0 No 
5 to 6 0 1 0 0 0 No 
7 to 41 1 1 0 0 0 Yes 
42 to 50 1 1 1 0 0 No 
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The findings in Table X thus indicate that, under FP-
based negotiation, policymakers might be able to use the 
RE subsidy SR to steer the negotiated transmission 
investment plan to the system-optimal plan Yc.  Indeed, a 
range of SR values could achieve this purpose, lessening 
the burden on policymakers for finding the “right” 
subsidy level.  However, setting SR too low or too high 
could lead to underinvestment or overinvestment, 
respectively, relative to
CY , resulting in system 
inefficiency (lower than possible SS).  
On the other hand, as seen in Table XI, LMP-based 
negotiation never results in a system-optimal 
transmission plan for the tested range of RE subsidies SR.   
It is important to consider more carefully the systemic 
reasons for this pessimistic finding. 
 The expected utility gain of the RE-GenCo in any 
transmission plan negotiation depends strongly on the 
price it receives for its wind power at Bus 6.  In the 
LMP-based case, this price is given by the LMP at Bus 6, 
which in turn is determined as the least cost to the 
system of servicing one additional MW of load at Bus 6.  
It is to the RE-GenCo’s advantage to ensure that the 
supplier of this “next” MW would not be his cheap wind 
unit but rather would be some more expensive 
conventional generator. By “overinvesting” in 
transmission in order to reduce or eliminate transmission 
congestion, the RE-GenCo can help to ensure that his 
cheap wind power will always be dispatched to 
maximum capacity to meet current demand.  In this case 
any “next” MW of load at Bus 6 would have to be 
supplied by conventional generation, and it would be the 
marginal cost of this more expensive generation that 
would then determine the price received for wind power 
at Bus 6.   
Although such strategic behavior on the part of the 
RE-GenCo wind producer leads to socially inefficient 
transmission investment (loss of SS), it is perfectly in 
accordance with the RE-GenCo’s private negotiation 
objective:  namely, maximization of own expected 
utility gain. As evidenced by the results reported in 
Table XI, this socially inefficient private behavior 
cannot be completely offset by RE subsidies.  
 
TABLE XI. LMP-BASED TRANSMISSION PLAN OUTCOMES 
FOR VARIOUS RE SUBSIDY LEVELS SR IN COMPARISON TO 
THE SYSTEM-OPTIMAL SOLUTION YC 
SR 
 ($/MWh) 
Candidate Match 
Yc? Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 
-10 to -6 0 0 0 0 0 No 
-5 to 50 1 1 0 1 0 No 
 
These findings are further supported by the 
corresponding results reported in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 for 
payment rate outcomes.  The negotiated transmission 
payment rate λ increases piece-wise linearly with SR.  A 
step-change in λ is a necessary and sufficient indicator 
that the corresponding change in SR has led to a change 
in the negotiated transmission plan Y.  Note in Fig. 6 
that the only step-change in λ occurs at the negative 
value SR = -$5/MWh, i.e., at a point where SR is a tax 
rather than a subsidy.  For all nonnegative values of SR, 
the LMP-based agreement on a plan Y is not affected by 
the SR level because the RE-GenCo’s revenues from the 
LMP-based sale of its wind in the energy market under 
Y are sufficient to incentivize the choice of Y regardless 
of this subsidy. 
 
 
Fig. 5. FP-based negotiated payment rate (λ) as a function of SR, given 
FP=$12/MWh 
 
 
Fig. 6. LMP-based negotiated payment rate (λ) as a function of SR  
 
The findings reported in this section provide support 
for the following conclusions. First, Nash bargaining 
results in fair and Pareto-efficient expected utility gains 
for the participants in merchant transmission investment 
negotiations, but it does not necessarily guarantee 
system optimality (maximum SS). Second, RE subsidies 
can be used in some cases to ensure that the negotiated 
plans are system optimal. Given a fixed RE contract 
price, RE subsidies can be used effectively to steer 
negotiated merchant transmission investment towards a 
system-optimal solution. Under market-based locational 
marginal pricing (LMP), however, the ability of RE 
subsidy settings to ensure the system optimality of 
negotiated merchant transmission investment is limited. 
This limitation needs to be recognized in the design of 
RE subsidies.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Significant transmission projects are needed to 
integrate and deliver RE resources, especially wind 
generation, to meet RPS mandates. In this study a Nash 
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bargaining negotiation methodology has been proposed 
for generation companies and transmission companies 
interested in sharing the uncertainties and market risks 
associated with RE integration. The Nash bargaining 
solution ensures fair and Pareto-efficient expected utility 
gains for the bargaining participants.  
The analytical and case-study findings reported in 
this study should also provide useful guidelines to 
policymakers interested in integrating RE resources into 
grid operations. These findings show the limited ability 
of RE subsidies under market-based locational marginal 
pricing (LMP) to ensure that negotiated merchant 
transmission investment planning will result in a 
system-optimal outcome. On the other hand, these 
findings suggest that RE subsidies can effectively be 
used to ensure the system optimality of merchant 
transmission planning when RE prices are fixed in 
advance through bilateral contracts. 
One important extension of this work would be to 
permit the joint consideration of RE generation and 
transmission investments in the bargaining process; see 
the Appendix for a discussion of how this could be done.  
It is noteworthy that the proposed Nash bargaining 
approach could also be applied to negotiation between 
TransCos and conventional GenCos, e.g., coal or natural 
gas power companies, which have higher fuel costs but 
lower uncertainties. For TransCos, a choice to cooperate 
with RE-GenCos versus conventional GenCos would 
depend on their expected profit and their risk attitude. If 
their expected profit gains with RE-GenCos are less than 
that with conventional GenCos, TransCos will rather 
choose the latter. Hence, a further interesting exploration 
would be how to design renewable subsidies to make 
RE-GenCos more competitive than conventional 
GenCos for merchant transmission investment.   
One limitation of the proposed approach as 
developed in the current study is that it only includes 
two players in the bargaining game. In the case of 
reinforcement of existing transmission lines, many 
beneficiaries arise. For such applications the proposed 
approach should be extended to consider more elaborate 
multi-player bargaining problems that include LSEs, 
conventional GenCos, additional RE-GenCos and 
TransCos, and possibly even policymakers. The 
extended framework could then be compared with the 
regulated framework to assess which option best 
facilitates the goal of achieving maximum net benefits 
for these stakeholders. 
Another important extension of this work would be 
to consider the use of more realistic scenarios for 
handling RE uncertainties by exploiting more advanced 
scenario generation methods, for example, the moment-
matching method developed in [39]. These and other 
extensions will be pursued in future work. 
APPENDIX 
The negotiation procedure presented in Section III is 
focused on merchant transmission projects. In reality, 
however, generation and transmission investments are 
often both needed for merchant projects and thus should 
be considered together in the bargaining process. An 
RE-GenCo could reasonably be unwilling to build an 
RE unit at a location if no lines currently connect this 
location to the grid, and a TransCo could reasonably be 
unwilling to construct a transmission line to a location if 
currently there is no need for this transmission line.  
A complete Nash Bargaining model that permits the 
joint consideration of RE generation and transmission 
investments is outlined in this appendix. In this 
formulation, detailed operating and maintenance (O&M) 
costs are considered for both transmission and 
generation. 
In practice, transmission line maintenance is 
performed on a scheduled basis and not based on the 
loadings and their frequencies. The maintenance cost is 
charged to the entities who receive the transmission 
service, e.g., generation or load. This cost is calculated 
in advance and put into the interconnection service 
agreement either in one lump sum payment using net-
present value or in annualized form based on this value. 
The latter annualized term is denoted below by TOMk. 
 Generation maintenance costs are generally divided 
into three parts: 
1) Fuel costs; 
2) Variable O&M (denoted by VOM): non-fuel 
costs that are a function of production; 
3) Fixed O&M (denoted by FOM): salaries and 
other costs for scheduled maintenance, in 
annualized form. 
In the model developed below, only VOM and FOM 
are included for RE units; fuel costs are ignored. In 
addition to the Nomenclature, the following notations 
are used. 
TOMk Annualized transmission O&M cost for line k 
CG  Set of candidate RE units g 
gICG  Annualized investment cost for RE unit g 
gVOM  Variable O&M cost for RE unit g 
gFOM  Annualized fixed O&M cost for RE unit g 
gY  Indicator function indicating the investment 
decision to build RE unit g (1) or not (0) 
 
The market-based expected utility functions for the 
RE-GenCo and the TransCo are given below.  Note that 
the expected utility function for the RE-GenCo now also 
depends on the generation investment decision Yg.
 ( )[[ ] ]
[ ]
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G
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U E D LMP S V
I
OM P
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
      (A1) 
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The proposed bargaining problem for this joint 
generation and transmission investment problem is 
presented below in (A3) – A(15).  
,,
max
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M
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Y
U U
                      
     (A3) 
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0MRGU                                    (A4) 
 0TU                                     (A5) 
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